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The Spanish Jury: 1888-1923
by Michael G. Burros*
I. INTRODUCTION
A rticle 125 of the new Spanish Constitution permits jury trials upon
passage of enabling legislation by the Cortes, Spain's legislature.1 The
country's most recent jury law was abrogated by the Franco government
in 1936,2 124 years after the first Spanish Constitution3 provided for jury
trials based on the theory that a sovereign people should judge them-
selves.4 Between 1812 and 1936 eight different laws were enacted and
abolished.5 The first five laws dealt specifically with libel and press re-
straint, whereas the last three covered a broad range of criminal law. The
most enduring criminal jury law was passed in 1888, during the
Restoration.
This Note will examine the relationship between the jury system and
Spanish society, more specifically, the effect of imposing a new legal sys-
tem upon an already existing legal system. Juridical statistics compiled
by Spain's Solicitors General' will be used to demonstrate that the jury
*Case Western Reserve University School of Law, J.D. Candidate (1982).
"Citizens can exert the popular will and participate in the administration of justice
through the jury, in whatever form and with respect to those penal processes that the law
shall determine, just as in the customary and traditional tribunals." CONST. ESPAfqOLA art.
125 (Spain).
2 The government claimed that the jury's defects were clear and that the Popular Front
had placed partially above strict justice in the jury system. 1 Legislaci6n del Gobierno Na-
cional 20 semestre (Sept. 8, 1936).
3 CONsT. ESPAPOLA art. 307 (Spain 1812).
4 See H. Nufz DE CEPEDA, EL JuRADo 5-7 (1933).
' Beginning in 1820, the Spanish jury laws, included: Law of 1820, see 14 NUEvA EN-
CICLOPEDUA JURIDICA, Jurado at 303 (F. Seix ed. 1971); Law of Oct. 17, 1837, 23 Decretos de
la Reina y de Is Cortes 254-55; Law of Apr. 2, 1852, 55 Colecci6n Legislativa pt. 1, at 578;
Law of Dec. 21, 1855, 66 Colecei6n Legislativa pt. 3, at 531; Law of June 22, 1864, 91 Colec-
ci6n Legislativa pt. 1, at 887; Law of Dec. 22, 1872, Colecci6n Legislativa pt. 1, at 889; Law
of Apr. 30, 1888, 140 Colecci6n Legislativa 708; Law of Apr. 27, 1931, 4 Resumen Legislativa
113.
6 I will use the term Solicitor General as a translation for the Fiscal del Tribunal
Supremo. Aside from the Solicitor General there are three other Fiscal titles which will be
referred to in this Note:
Fiscal Regional - Regional Attorney General
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
system adapted to the characteristics of the then prevailing legal and po-
litical structure of Restoration Spain. Furthermore, this empirical data
will show that previous hypotheses which linked illiteracy with a high
rate of criminal acquittals are incorrect.
II. HISTORY OF THE SPANISH JURY
The 1888 jury law7 can best be examined after discussing its forerun-
ners and the foundations which they established for the later develop-
ment of a full criminal jury. Initially, the jury system was discussed by
the commission which drafted the 1812 Constitution.8 Commission mem-
bers reasoned that the jury would be an expression of popular sovereignty
which would enable the populace to participate in the judicial process.9
The 1812 Constitution adopted the notion of popular government and
also permitted the jury, as an institution of popular sovereignty, to decide
issues of fact.' 0 Eight years later, the Cortes passed enabling legislation
mandating the use of the jury in election fraud cases, premised on the
belief that these cases were best handled by the people."'
The juror pool included all male citizens, 25 years and older, who
were elected annually by the local ayuntamientos [town councils]. A two-
tiered jury system was devised. The first tier consisted of nine men who
acted as a grand jury. Their function was to determine whether or not
there was a cause of action. The second tier was composed of twelve men
who delivered the verdict after the trial. The French abolished this sys-
tem in 1822 when they restored Ferdinand VII to his position as absolute
ruler of Spain. s
The 1837 Cortes produced a new constitution that liberalized the po-
litical process by widening the voting franchise and permitting municipal
self-government.' s A new bill regulating freedom of the press was enacted
which would use the jury as a fact finder. Under the system used in the
Fiscal Provincial - Provincial Attorney General
Fiscal Municipal - District Attorney
Strictly speaking, ". . . we can define the Fiscal as an institution, created by law, inside the
judicial system to co-operate in the administration of justice, promoting the law on behalf of
society when it will benefit the collective interest and public and social order." E. AGUnYaA
DE PAZ 1 EL DERECHO JUDICIAL ESPAROL 441 (1920).
Law of Apr. 30, 1888, 140 Colecci6n Legislativa 708.
O NUREZ, supra note 4, at 5-7.
9 Id. at 5-7.
10 CONST. ESPAROLA art. 307 (Spain 1812).
' NuREZ, supra note 4, at 8; 14 NUEVA ENCICLOPEDIA JURIDICA, Jurado at 33 (F. Seix
ed. 1971).
12 Id. The French Invasion put an end to both the jury and the Spanish Constitution of
1812.
13 R. HERR, MODERN SPAIN 85 (1974).
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press cases, a fixed number of jurors were selected on the basis of the
amount of taxes they paid.14 The more taxes that the citizen paid, the
greater the likelihood that the citizen would become a juror. The names
of those who were eligible were written on slips of paper and placed in an
urn from which 72 names were drawn for each case. The jury was selected
after both parties to the proceeding had exercised their individual right
to challenge up to 30 jurors. 5 If more than 12 jurors remained, then the
jury would be chosen in numerical order of withdrawal from the urn.-6
The 1837 press law was annulled eight years later during the govern-
ment of military strongman, Narvaez.17 By royal decree the press law was
replaced by stricter censorship, and the jury system was eliminated. 8 The
government ministers, in their memorandum to the Queen Regent, stated
their desire to dissolve the jury because it had not served the country
well. The memorandum also revealed that the ministers were concerned
about the dearth of guilty verdicts returned; it stated, ". . . fear is firmly
planted that the evil doers will not be convicted and that the populace
will be left defenseless ....",,9
Narvaez left office in 1851, and by 1852 a new press law had been
promulgated.20 This decree prohibited press coverage and public speech
not formerly reached by statute. The government resorted to the jury sys-
tem to avoid the appearance of direct intervention in the guilt determin-
ing process. A memorandum sent by the cabinet members to the Queen
Regent indicated that they hoped that the jury would serve to moderate
the harshness of the new press law by mitigating seemingly inflexible
court rules.21 The law did not give the majority of the country an oppor-
tunity to participate in the fact-finding process; rather, the jury pool was
limited to the wealthiest members of society. The jurors were drawn from
100 citizens paying the highest taxes in Madrid; the 60 top taxpayers in
each of the regional capitals and the 30 top taxpayers in each of the pro-
vincial capitals. 22 The jury pool contained some of the most powerful peo-
ple in the country; a group which, because of its privileged status, proba-
bly was closely associated with the government. Less than one year later,
in 1853, the government eliminated the jury system due to the difficulties
of administering it. The government proffered only a vague explanation
', Law of Oct. 17, 1837, 23 Decretos de la Reina y de la Cortes 254-55.
5 Id.
26 Id.
7 Narvaez held power from 1843-1846 and again from 1847-1851. See generally R.
HERR, supra note 9.
"' Law of July 6, 1845, 35 Colecci6n de Leyes pt. 2, at 20.
19 Id. at 18.
10 Law of April 2, 1852, 55 Colecci6n Legislativa pt. 1, at 578.
21 Id. at 581.
22 Id. at 578.
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for this action. It maintained that the jury and Spanish culture were not
compatible.23
In December of 1855, one year after a successful liberal pronun-
camiento,2' the jury was reinstated, but only for cases involving freedom
of the press. 25 In 1857, the jury was again abolished, simply because the
philosophy of the government changed.2 Seven years later it was restored
in a form substantially similar to that established by the 1852 statute.
This law remained in effect until 1872.27 The abolition and restoration of
the jury system became a regular occurrence; the liberals installed it and
the conservatives abolished it.
When the First Republic was proclaimed in 1872, the Cortes estab-
lished the first criminal jury system.28 The method of jury selection was
changed from the scheme of previous years which was based on the pay-
ment of taxes to a new standard which designated literate males over 30
years old as the initial pool. 29 The government was enthusiastic in its sup-
port of the jury system. By 1875, however, serious administrative
problems had developed which led to dissolution of the jury.30
The Minister of Justice, speaking of the administrative problems,
said, "The past two years have brought into sharp relief the inconve-
niences of the institution."'" He mentioned three specific problems: first,
the three judge panels required for each jury trial resulted in less serious
criminal cases being backlogged;32 second, there was little public support
for the jury, since citizens preferred paying a fine to sitting on the jury;3
finally, the treasury was being drained of funds by the overtime and
travel expenses which were paid to judges and prosecutors.3 Therefore,
on January 3, 1875, the law was suspended,35 and it was not again revived
until 1888. As Spain entered the Restoration era, the country had no
criminal jury system.
Thus, until 1888, Spain had virtually no experience with the criminal
jury. Only the short-lived 1872 law provided a jury trial for most criminal
charges. Prior to 1872, the jury pool was drawn from the citizens paying
23 Law of Jan. 2, 1853, 58 Colecci6n Legislativa pt. 1, at 3.
24 Pronuncamiento is a military uprising against the government; literally a pronounce-
ment against the government.
21 Law of Dec. 21, 1855, 66 Colecci6n Legislativa pt. 3, at 531.
2 See Gaceta de Madrid 1 (July 14, 1857).
:7 Law of June 22, 1864, 9 Colecci6n Legislativa pt. 1, at 887.
28 Law of Dec. 22, 1872, Colecci6n Legislativa pt. 2, at 889, 991.
29 Id. at art. 658.
so Law of Jan. 3, 1875, 114 Colecci6n de Decretos 6.




35 Id. at 6.
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the most taxes. The 1872 law brought major changes in juror selection
and created many problems, most of which reappeared when the Cortes
passed another comprehensive jury law in 1888.3
III. JURY LAW OF 1888
The 1888 law can best be analyzed in light of the political structure
of 19th and 20th century Spain. A brief explanation of the political order,
established in 1874 with the restoration of the Burbon Monarchy, pro-
vides a background for such an analysis.
A. The Restoration
During the Restoration period, the Spanish political system was
based on the cooperation of the two major monarchist parties.37 New elec-
tions were held whenever the governing party blundered or became un-
popular. After dishonest balloting, the party then out of power took over
the government.38 This was known as the turno pacifico or peaceful
change. 9
During the Eurno pacifico, the Minister of Gobernaci6n, whose func-
tions were similar to the present U.S. Secretary of the Interior, held ex-
tensive negotiations with all power groups in the country.40 These discus-
sions produced lists of candidates approved for election. 1 Known as the
encasillado,42 each list was sent to the provincial governors, all of whom
were appointees of the Minister of Gobernaci6n. The governors then took
whatever steps were necessary to ensure that the local party leaders
elected the encasillado candidate.
4
This structure depended upon the local boss, or cacique,44 for its ex-
istence. The cacique served to bridge the gap between his locality and the
central government,'4 5 . as a party or government functionary, he main-
tained powers chiefly because citizen apathy resulted in low voter turn-
3' Law of Apr. 30, 1888, 140 Colecci6n Legislativa 708.
37 R. HERR, supra note 13, at 115.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 J. VARELA ORTEGA, Los AMIGOS POLITICOS 427 (1977); Tussel, The Functioning of the
Cacique System in Andalusia 1890-1931 (trans. Fleming and Fleming) in POLITICS AND So-
cIETY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY SPAIN 3-5 (S. Payne ed. 1976).
41 Cf. Tussel, supra note 40.
42 Encasillado literally means pigeon-holed, but in this context it refers to the hand-
picked government candidates.
'3 R. HERR, supra note 13, at 115.
" The word cacique is of Carribean origin. When the Spanish conquered the Carribean
area they used the cacique as a bridge between the governor and the governed.
45 J. VARELA, supra note 40, at 354.
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out."" In order to deliver votes the cacique gave favors to his followers.
The type of favor which the cacique delivered was often illegal; running
the gamut from embezzlement to bribery.4 7 At other times the cacique
asked government officials in the capital, Madrid, to suspend decisions
harmful to his partisans.4" This system required the central government
to ignore local corruption, which in most provinces took the form of pa-
tronage.49 In short, caciquismo was similar to the political machines
which operated in the United States.
The ascension of Alfonso XIII to the Spanish throne in 1902 is often
cited as the beginning of the demise of the caciqual system.50 The break-
down of the system was due in part to King Alfonso's unwillingness to
allow his friends to leave office, which resulted in a disruption of the
turno pacifico,5" and in part to the deterioration of the monarchist par-
ties' power bases in urban areas.52 Nevertheless, the system did remain
strong throughout most of the country until the beginning of the dictator-
ship of Miguel Primo de Rivera in 1923 53 To illustrate, between 1890 and
1931 elections were held for over 1,000 seats from rural Andalucia to the
Cortes, and the encasillado candidate lost only 13 times.14
The judicial system played an integral role in the caciques' ability to
maintain power.55 Since electoral fraud was a criminal offense, judges
were shifted from region to region in order to guarantee immunity from
prosecution for caciqual electoral machinations.56 In Old Castille, the ca-
cique Gamazo wielded power from 1876 until the turn of the century"r
due largely to his friendship with the magistrates. In the province of Bur-
gos, Alonso Martinez used his position as an important jurist and Minis-
ter of Justice to maintain a political apparatus in the 1870's and 1880's.5s
In the region of Galicia, unscrupulous lawyers and municipal secretaries
46 Id. See, e.g., R. CARR, SPAIN 1808-1934, at 366-379 (1966); see also J. VIcENS VvES,
APPROACHES TO THE HISTORY OF SPAIN 137 (J. Ullman, trans. 1970) (discussing the caciques
rise to power).
47 J. VARELA, supra note 40, at 360.
48 "The political friends - that group of rewarded and fearful clients - who acceded in
the perpetuation of the caciques' power in return for which they would help the government
... [The government] would then suspend some administrative decisions which were harm-
ful to them [the caciques]." Id. at 354.
49 Id. at 358.
60 But see, R. CARR, supra note 46, at 366.
51 R. HERR, supra note 13, at 115.
52 Tussel, supra note 40, at 8-9.
-3 Cf. id. at 3-20.
64 Id. at 10.
15 R. CARR, supra note 46, at 372-73 (1966).
68 J. VARELA, supra note 40, at 405-06; R. CARR, supra note 46, at 373 (1966).
57 J. VARELA, supra note 40, at 371-74.
08 Id. at 376.
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took advantage of confused land titles to threaten recalcitrant citizens
with the loss of property. 9 Galicia was controlled by the cacique Gasset
through this legal scheme."'
The caciques' local power base in Spain may have motivated the cen-
tral government to attempt to give the people some voice, through the
jury device, in the government. This system, to some extent, supported
the corruption that allowed the government to control the outcome of the
electoral process. Whether the system was an elaborate charade or a legit-
imate attempt at reform is immaterial, since the actual operation of the
jury in Spain became a futile exercise.
B. The Jury List
1. Eligibility and exemption
The jury law of April 25, 1888, established a jury panel of 12 men 1
whose duty it was to declare the guilt or innocence of the accused,6 2 and
to determine whether circumstantial facts supported modification of the
penalty sought by the government. s After the verdict was rendered, the
three judges who presided over the court6 imposed the appropriate sen-
tence.65 The jurisdiction of the court extended to all criminal acts, from
theft to crimes against the state.6
Jury duty was obligatory upon all who were called.67 The pool of ju-
rors was drawn from all literate, secular citizens who were thirty years old
or older, heads of households, district residents for four years, and fully
possessed of their civil and political rights.68 Crimes allegedly committed
in a given district were tried before jurors from that district.69
The law also required a separate grouping according to ability for
academics, professionals, and public officials who were not heads of
households.7 0 Included in this category were provincial deputies, members
59 Id. at 388-89.
60 Id.
1 Law of April 30, 1888, 140 Colecci6n Legislativa 708, art. 1 [hereinafter cited as Ley
del Jurado].
2 Id. at art. 2.
I' d.
"Id. at art. 1.
6' Id. at art. 3.
" Id. at art. 4. The crimes which the jury could hear were separated into two categories.
The first category was composed of traditional crimes and the second dealt with crimes of
the press, libel and slander.
617 Id. at art. 8.
11 Id. at art. 9.
69 Id. at art. 44.
70 Id.
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of the Cortes and retired members of the armed forces.71 This provision
was intended to weigh jury selection so that the intelligentsia were guar-
anteed a greater percentage of jury seats than would result in a random
selection process.
It appears that the drafters of the bill did not want a large jury pool,
for at the time the jury law requiring jurors to be male and literate was
passed less than 30 percent of the population could read and write.7 2
Males composed approximately 49 percent of the population73 and the
total number of men 31 years old and older who could read and write
accounted for only 9.6 percent of the population.7 " Furthermore, there
were four categories relating to exclusions and exemptions from jury
duty. The first exclusion dealt with persons who had lost some portion of
their right of self-control by virtue of being a debtor, a ward of a charity,
or a prisoner.75 The second grouping excluded certain government work-
ers considered indispensible and prevented public prosecutors or judges
from sitting on the jury.76 The third exclusion kept all interested parties
from becoming members of the jury.77 The fourth category was a volun-
tary exemption offered to the elderly, manual laborers, members of the
Cortes and those who had been called in previous years.78
These exemptions represent the drafters' fears that jurors would be
subject to undue influence. The requirement that jurors be literate and in
full possession of their civil and political rights was intended to assure
their independence. The exclusion of public prosecutors, judges, and in-
terested parties protected jurors from their prejudices. These qualifica-
tions drastically reduced the number of people eligible to sit on the jury.
2. Municipal list: first compilation
Lists of all those eligible for jury duty were compiled at the munici-
pal level. The local judge and fiscal municipal 9 formed a committee with
the mayor or his lieutenant, the three citizens paying the highest property
taxes, and the top commercial taxpayer in the municipality. This commit-
tee had the responsibility of preparing an initial eligibility list. A commit-
tee member's failure to attend the committee meetings resulted in a fine.
71 Id.
7 INSTITUTO GEOGRAFICO Y ESTADfSTICO, 1887 CENSO DE LA POBLACI6N DE ESPA A XXV
(1891).
73 Id. at XIX.
71 INSTITUTO GEOGRAFICO Y ESTADfSTICO, 1912 ARUARO ESTADfSTICO 124 (1913).
70 Ley del Jurado, supra note 61, at art. 10.
71 Id. at art. 11.
7 Id. at art. 12.
7 Id. at art. 13.
79 See supra note 6.
Vol. 14:177
SPANISH JURY
The secretary of the municipality also attended but could neither vote
nor take part in the deliberations. 0
The fiscales believed that proper formation of the lists was the secret
to a successful jury system. The author of the jury bill, Manuel Alonso
Martinez, stated in a letter to his friend, Victor Covibn y Junco:
The jury which will begin to function in Spain will demand as an
indispensible ingredient the formation of jury lists... all the safeguards
built into the law are illusory... if the election of the jurors does not
inspire one to aim for justice and result in the necessary combination of
morality and intelligence in the trier of fact just as in the trier of law.81
While the government recognized that honest list formation was essential
to the success of the jury, the task was delegated to the same local offi-
cials who were expected to manipulate the elections in favor of the encas-
sillado candidate. Since the jury was competent to hear cases involving
electoral fraud, the local officials were in a position to control subsequent
trials through their control of the list formation process. Corrupt local
officials had both the motive and the opportunity to manipulate jury lists.
Thus the government was faced with choosing between protecting the in-
tegrity of the jury or maintaining the turno pacifico. It was not surprising
under these circumstances that many fiscales blamed the caciqual system
for the increasing number of not guilty verdicts. 2
3. Municipal list: problems
Every year complaints were received by the Solicitor General from
the provincial fiscales about impropriety in the jury selection process.
What follows is a catalogue of some of the more blatant abuses, as de-
picted by a number of government officials. The President of the Council
of Ministers recounted his own experience with the jury:
Since the jury law has been promulgated no one in my family has
had anything to do with the institution, although the mentally ill child of
a nanny was chosen to serve once. About two years ago I was chosen to
be on the jury list review committee for my judicial district... The gov-
ernment officials were surprised that I attended the meeting. No one else
from the district appeared. I demanded that fines be imposed, and all
concerned appeared at the next meeting. This took place in Madrid, not
8o Ley del Jurado, supra note 61, at art. 14. The fine could be anywhere between 150
and 500 pesetas. The 1897 dollar equivalent would have been between $30 and $100. M.
MUHLEMAN, MoNETARY SYsTEMS OF THE WORLD 196 (1897).
5i Letter from Manuel Alonso Martinez to Victor Covifn y Junco (May 20, 1888), re-
printed in, FISCALL DEL TRmUNAL SUPREMO, 1918 MEMORiAS XLIII-XLIV.
"I See, e.g., FIsCALIA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1917 MEMORIAS XII; FIscALIA DEL TREBU-
NAL SUPREMO, 1921 MEMORIAs 40.
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in some sleepy little village. We started our work and found that the
Compafiia del Mediodla had padded its list of workers entitled to exemp-
tions. The jury list did not contain the names of anyone who lived
outside of their stores (no one on the first, second, or third floors). The
list of abilities contained the names of only five or six academics. 3
Further evidence of questionable practices respecting jury list prepa-
ration in Madrid appears in the Solicitor General's reports. The Fiscal of
Madrid stated that in the 10 districts of Madrid only 17 people were on
the lists of ability, and in four of the districts there were no lists of ability
at all. Since Madrid was one of the most literate areas in Spain, this re-
sult hardly seems possible, absent fraud." In a district with 50,000 inhab-
itants, only 411 people were on the household list. 5 Upon further scru-
tiny, the fiscal noted that the list was limited to lower-floor tenants of the
city's buildings, and that the list failed to include almost all of the promi-
nent persons. In addition, the Madrid, Zar, and Alicante Railroad, which
officially listed 411 exempt district workers, sent a list containing 490 ex-
empt workers to the list forming committee.8
These examples from Madrid seem to be characteristic of the country
as a whole. Due to the resistance of the middle and upper classes, the lists
were not formed in accordance with the law. Eventually the exemption of
wealthy persons from jury duty, as a result of bribery and pay-offs, be-
came common practice for local officials. Thus, juries were composed of
the poorer and less literate members of the community. Most fiscales
claimed that these uneducated jurors were responsible for the difficulty in
obtaining the guilty verdicts desired.87 Some felt that apathy towards the
political system made the jury easier to manipulate.8 s Despite the Solici-
tor's General's claim that their institution was the best friend that the
jury ever had, the complaints about the system seem unfounded when
examined in light of the fiscales complete failure to prosecute the people
who evaded jury duty.
4. Municipal list: reform of the compilation process
In an attempt to improve the jury selection process, the Spanish
83 FISCALIA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1921 MEMORIAS at 41-42. All of this occurred in one
of the most fashionable districts of Madrid.
84 In 1910, Madrid was divided into 10 judicial districts. The entire city had a popula-
tion of 556,958. Of this number there were 99,662 literate males over 30 years old or approx-
imately 18% of the population. INSTITUTO GEOGRAFICO Y ESTADISTICA, 1 CENSO DE LA POBLA-
CI6N ESPAROLA 184-87 (1910); 3 CENSO DE LA POBLACI6N ESPAROLA 238 (1910).
85 FISCALIA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1915 MEMORIAS XI.
86 Id.
:7 See, e.g., FISCALIA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1921 MEMORIAS 30-43.
88 See FISCALIA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1903 MEMORIAs 33.
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Crown, in 1897, ordered local prosecutors to be more conscientious in the
list formation. The prosecutors were required to take a census in order to
compile juror lists. The provincial and regional fiscales were ordered to
review the results to ensure that the lists were composed of eligible citi-
zens."9 In 1898, after one year in operation, the Solicitor General reported
widespread resistance on the part of the local fiscales. For example, only
six of the 206 municipalities in Toledo completed census forms as re-
quested; in Zamora, 139 municipalities had not even distributed the
forms.90 Many of the lists used by the other provinces to comply with the
order were the old improperly drawn lists.91
In 1899, the Solicitor General reported that the work of the
municipal fiscales was grossly inadequate. He cited six reasons for the
difficulty: 1) the transitory nature of the job; 2) the lack of stimulus to do
a good job; 3) the corruption. on the local level; 4) the communication
problem between the provincial capitals and the municipalities; 5) the
lack of strong ties between the provincial and municipal fiscales; and 6)
the municipal fiscales' dependence on politics.9 2
Twenty-three years later, the Government was still unsuccessful in
its attempt to implement the royal decree of 1897.3 The government,
aware of the difficulties involved in enforcing the law, was unable or un-
willing to improve the situation." Suggestions were made that census in-
formation be used to form the jury lists." There was no guarantee, how-
ever, that the census would have been any more impartial than the local
committees, since the census was used to manipulate the vote even before
universal manhood sufferage was introduced." The fact that the list com-
pilation process created procedural changes which had no effect on the
problems of jury fraud would indicate that the problems originated either
in Spain's socio-political system or in the extreme complexity of the law.
5. Municipal list: adjustment
Once the names were gathered, each municipality compiled two eligi-
, Memorandum of March 8, 1897, 161 Colecci6n Legislativa 369, 372. In his message to
the Queen Regent, the Solicitor General intimated that the wealthy were avoiding jury duty
and the municipal judges were not imposing fines. The Royal Decree was a result of the
memorandum.
90 FISCALA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1898 MEMoRAS 63.
91 Id.
92 FisCALA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1899 MEMORiAS 70-72.
11 FiSCALIA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1922 MEMORAS 29-30.
' The government must have been aware that the lists were formed improperly. Every
year without fail the provincial and regional attorneys general mentioned this shortcoming
in their Memorias sent to the Solicitor General.
"FiscALfA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1892 MEMORAS 49.
J. VARELA, supra note 40, at 422.
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bility lists, one for heads of households and the other for people of ability.
Those heads of households who also qualified for the abilities list would
be placed in the latter.97 One set of lists was compiled for each municipal
judge.98 The lists were developed by January 15th99 and posted by Febru-
ary 1st for 15 days. During this 15 day period, any resident of the munici-
pality could ask to be included on the list and those for whom inclusion
was voluntary could request exclusion. 100 Jury eligibility hearings. were
held before the municipal judge'01 who subsequently decided whether to
include the claimant in the jury pool.102
Those whose claims were rejected could appeal the decision if they
appeared before the provincial criminal court.103 There was no appeal
from the criminal court's decision.' 0 ' After all appeals were completed,
and no later than May 1st,10 5 the lists from each municipality were for-
warded to the judges of instruction"' in the corresponding judicial dis-
trict. Delays were subject to penalty.0 7
Since the fiscales complained about the scarcity of qualified jurors,
one might expect the number of appeals to be substantial. Notwithstand-
ing, it was not. Indeed, the first recorded use of the appeals process came
eleven years after the law was approved. In that case, a doctor was ex-
cluded from the list upon his improper request. Aware of the impropriety,
a political enemy petitioned for his inclusion. The fiscal who reported the
incident stated that the petition was motivated not by a desire to serve
the public, but rather by a self-serving desire to discredit the doctor. 10 8 In
effect, the judiciary had become a valuable political tool.
Ironically, the ideological foundation for the jury system was eroded
through the manipulation of its processes. The lack of appeals was proba-
bly a reflection of the fact that those who wished to avoid jury duty did so
through unofficial methods. As a result the jury was composed of people
who were either: 1) not aware of methods by which they could avoid ser-
vice, 2) aware of such methods, but unable to effect them, 3) motivated
by the hope of financial gain, or 4) genuinely interested in serving the
97 Id. at art. 16.
98 Id. at art. 15.
go Id. at art. 16.
100 Id. at art. 18.
101 Id. at art. 19.
102 Id. at art. 21.
103 Id. at art. 22-24.
I" Id. at art. 25.
105 Ley del Jurado, supra note 61, at art. 25.
100 Juez de Instrucci6n is a judge who serves the same purpose as the prosecutor and
jury at a grand jury hearing.
107 Ley del Jurado, supra note 61, at art. 30.
109 FISCALfA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1899 MEMORIAS 74.
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public; the latter explanation being quite remote. Interestingly, the cen-
tral government had tremendous power over many local governments to
obtain desired electoral results," 9 but this power was not exercised to cor-
rect jury formation.
6. Judicial district list: compilation
During the month of May, the judges of instruction designated a new
committee of eight members. The committee was composed of the parish
priest, the primary school master longest resident in the judicial district,
four taxpayers selected randomly from amongst the top twelve real estate
taxpayers, and two of the top six business taxpayers in the judicial dis-
trict. No one on a municipal committee was eligible to serve on the dis-
trict committee. 110
When the judges of instruction received the municipal lists they con-
vened the committee. The members then chose ten percent of the names
on the head of household list whom they thought best able to fulfill the
job of juror. If there were more than 500 names on the head of household
list, the corresponding minimum number of jurors was 200. If, however,
there were less than 500 names on the list, the minimum number of jurors
was 150. If the lists of ability contained more than 150 names, the com-
mittee reduced the list to 150. When there were less than 150 names on
the ability list, reduction was prohibited.
7. Regional list: finalization
The judges of instruction sent the revised lists to the regional crimi-
nal court. The governing board of each regional criminal court convened
to form the official lists for each judicial district.
If the revised head of household list contained 200 names and the
revised list of ability contained 100 names the lists were reduced to 150
and 75 names respectively. When the head of the household list contained
between 150 and 200 names it was reduced to 150 names and when the
list contained less than 150 names it was reduced to 50 names."1 If there
were not enought names to form a 75-name list of ability, the top taxpay-
ing households were taken from that list and added to the abilities list.112
The municipal officials made sure that the final lists contained no incom-
petent persons.1 1 3 The final lists, completed before August 1st, were pub-
'09 J. VARELA, supra note 40, at 408.
110 Ley del Jurado, supra note 61, at art. 31.
I Id.
112 Id. at art. 33, § 1.
3 Id. at art. 33, § 5.
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lished in the Official Bulletin." 4
C. Jury Selection
Trials were scheduled every four months. Jury lists were used for one
year extending from August to August. Most of the trials were conducted
in the courts of the provincial capitals unless the case loads became so
heavy that courts in smaller towns had to be used. 115 Trial dockets-were
set on December, April, and August 16th at the provincial criminal
court."' Once a controversy was found to warrant a jury trial, 42 poten-
tial jurors were selected:" 7 20 names from the household list, 16 names
from the abilities list, and six substitutes were chosen by lottery from the
judicial district in which the case arose. 18 Any prospective juror could be
challenged for cause and dismissed."19 Challenges not agreeable to all par-
ties were heard and decided by the provincial court within 24 hours of the
hearing. 20 The lists were then submitted to the district judges who
turned them over the the municipal judges so that prospective jurors
could be notified.' 2' If at least 28 jurors and substitutes appeared, final
jury selection began. If less appeared, the court attempted to locate suita-
ble replacements, otherwise the trial would be postponed. 22
At the appointed date and time, the jurors appeared before the
judges for final jury selection." 3 Voir dire began by drawing the names of
jurors and submitting each to challenge. Both the prosecution and the
defense could use an unlimited number of peremptory challenges until
only 12 jurors and two alternates remained.'24
The fiscales complained bitterly about this system of voir dire,
charging it gave the defense counsel a better chance to select a jury sym-
pathetic to his client's case. Theorizing that the local counsel, knowing
the populace better than the prosecutor, would be more familiar with the
disposition of or better able to bribe the jurors, some fiscales felt that the
process bred more corruption. In retaliation, the prosecutors challenged
everyone passed by the defense so that the jury would ultimately be com-
posed of the last fourteen jurors drawn.2 5
114 Id. at art. 33, § 6.
'5 Id. at art. 42.
Id. at art. 43.
117 Id. at art. 44.
I16 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at arts. 44-45.
121 Id. at art. 46.
.. Id. at art. 52.
121 Id. at art. 53.
124 Id. at art. 56.




Following voir dire, the jurors were sworn and the trial began.126 Ju-
rors could question either side at the court's discretion. 127 If, during the
trial, both sides reached agreement concerning facts which would take the
trial outside the jury's competence, the defense had the option to con-
tinue before the jury or to try the case .to the judge.128 Conversely, if the
trial was originally tried to a judge and subsequently discovered to be
within the competence of a jury, the defense could choose the fact
finder.229
At the end of each argument, the court orally reviewed the evidence
for the benefit of the jury. The judges explained the charges, enunciated
the legal tests necessary to prove the crime, and presented the appropri-
ate attenuating, exculpatory, and aggravating circumstances involved. 10
The standard against which guilt was to be determined was left to the
consciences of the jurors.""' The Court was charged with maintaining the
strictest impartiality throughout the trial." 2
The next step in the trial was the formulation of interrogatories for
the jury. These were drawn from the definitive conclusions of the prose-
cution and the defense. 133 Anything not included by the parties was
added by the court."' The first part of the question was, "Is John Doe
guilty of.. ." followed by specific questions relating to key facts. The
subsequent series of questions related to any extenuating, attenuating, or
aggravating circumstances." 5
The jurors received the questions and retired to the jury room. Dur-
ing their deliberations,'2 6 they could request clarification of the interroga-
tories.137 After deliberating they took an oral vote on the questions re-
sponding "yes" or "no" to each question.' s A majority vote decided the
fate of the accused."39 Jurors were not permitted to abstain."40 Notwith-
126 Ley del Jurado, supra note 61, at arts. 57-58.
127 Id. at art. 63.
118 Id. at art. 65.
129 Id,
130 Id. at art. 72.
1-1 Id. at art. 84.
132 Id. at art. 68.
133 The definitive conclusions were composed by counsel after they completed their
arguments. Basically the conclusions served to restate each side's case including whatever
modifications were necessitated by the particular facts of the trial. Id. at art. 70.
131 Id. at art. 75.
185 Id. at art. 76.
12-6 Id. at art. 80.
137 Id. at art. 82.
'3 Id. at art. 84.
129 Id. at art. 85.
140 Id. at art. 86.
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standing, abstentions were considered not guilty votes.141 Three absten-
tions resulted in a warning to the juror, after which the juror was fined. 4"
When the jurors completed the interrogatories they signed them and
returned them to the court where the foreman read the conclusions. 1 43
The court proceeded to sentence the the defendant based upon the
verdict. 14
A verdict could be returned to the jury for reform if: 1) a question
was omitted, 2) the answers to the interrogatories were contradictory or
not congruent, 3) the jury acted ultra vires, or 4) there had been an irreg-
ularity in the deliberation process."4 The court explained the problem
and instructed the jury to arrive at a proper verdict.146 If the court sent
the jury back three times without a proper verdict, a special poll was
taken to determine if a verdict could be reached.247 If the judges found
that a verdict could not be reached, a new jury was impaneled and the
case retried. 148 If one party's request for reform of the verdict was re-
fused, the party could appeal by protesting the ruling. 49 Appeals were
also allowed on the basis of mistake of procedure or law.150 If there were
no appeals, sentence was entered.
In summary, the jury system was characterized by two major compo-
nents: the jury selection process and the trial. The jury selection process
unfolded in three stages: 1) the creation of the lists; 2) the verification of
the lists; and 3) voir dire. The trial was divided into six distinct elements
1) the arguments, 2) the judge's explanation of the charges, 3) the sub-
mission of the interrogatories to the jury, 4) the jury deliberation, 5) the
verdict, and 6) sentencing.
IV. THE JURY AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The impact of the jury system on the Spanish judiciary remains un-
clear. Prosecutors claimed that the jury was causing the system to deteri-
orate. Citing juror apathy and illiteracy, they criticised the increasing
number of acquittals.' 5' Therefore it is important to examine the jury as
an institution of popular sovereignty.
141 Id. at art. 86.
142 Id. at art. 88.
14- Id. at art. 90.
144 Id. at art. 96.
" Id. at art. 107.
146 Id. at art. 108.
147 Id. at art. 110.
148 Id.
149 Id. at art. 111.
150 Id. at art. 116.
151 FISCALIA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1922 MEMORIAS 29-30.
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A. The Jury as Sovereign
As early as 1812 the argument for the jury centered on its function as
an institution of popular sovereignty:
I have no doubt that some day we will establish among ourselves the
healthy and liberal institution the jury so that all Spaniards will be able
to terminate their differences through elected jurors and among equals,
so no one will have to fear for their future because of the Courts or gov-
ernment influence .... 152
The 1888 jury was seen in the same light. The institution was once com-
pared to the king because both could absolve and condemn without giving
reasons.
153
In 1896, Solicitor General Luciano Puga said that the jury was the
natural and logical consequence of the political system. It affirmed dig-
nity and equality before the law in addition to harmonizing justice and
popular sovereignty."" The jury was intended to make the law and popu-
lar perceptions correspond: "It is not important to society whether jurors
judge by official tests or by other private means, what is important to
society is that the judgment is honest and just."155
As originally planned the pool from which jurors were selected con-
stituted roughly 9.6 percent 156 of the population. With the passage of
time, literacy rates rose and the pool expanded. It totaled 10 percent in
1900,157 10.9 percent in 1910,158 and 12 percent in 1920.159 Considering
152 This was spoken before the Cadiz Constitutional convention, reprinted in Nuftz,
supra note 4; see e.g., "The institution of the jury is a valuable conquest of the September
[democratic - republican] revolution. It is a natural and genuine consequence of the demo-
cratic principles and their most profound expression in the legal sphere and in the practice
of law." 111 Colecci6n Legislativa 479 (Sept. 28, 1873).
,53 FIscAUA DEL TRBuNAL SUPREMO, 1899 MEMoRLw 86.
'5 FISCAL&A DEL TRiBUNAL SUPREMO, 1896 MEMORIAS 897.
155 FisCALfA DEL TRmUNAL SUPREMO, 1899 MEMORIUS 80. The jury was described by
Aguilera, as a political-judicial institution: "The jury is a political and judicial institution.
This concept is generally given credence by the liberal school of thought, because the jury
permits popular intervention in the administration of justice... as Manzini said it [the
jury] represents the citizens participation in the judiciary, symbol and compendium of pub-
lic liberty, expression of popular sovereignty and indispensible compliment to all liberal re-
gimes. E. AGUILERA, supra note 6, at 93.
'" INSTrrUTO GEOGRAFICO Y EsTADISTco, 1912 A uAmio EsTADIsTico 124 (1913). Pro-
spective jurors were required to be at least 30 years old, literate, in full possession of their
political rights (this excluded women who did not possess full political rights at the time)
and for the most part to be the head of a household. The figures used for this note are taken
from census tables and do not include males between the ages of 30 and 31. Furthermore,
the figures do not reflect the number of men who were head of households or incapacitated.
The assumption is that all men over 30 were heads of households and in full possession of
their rights.
17 INSTITUTO GEOGRAFICO Y EsTADIsTIco, 2 CENSO DE LA POBLACI6N ESPAROLA 296-97
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that universal manhood sufferage was introduced in 1890, these figures
demonstrate that few had a voice when it came to popular sovereignty on
the jury. The intended pool, the middle class and the elite, abdicated re-
sponsibility by leaving the jury system in the hands of local politicians.160
In most provinces this resulted in the transfer of responsibility to the
more "modest classes" 161 the members of which were believed to be less
qualified.
The fiscales saw these "less qualified" jurors as the crux of the high
rate of acquittal. They believed that the jury's inability to deliver guilty
verdicts was due to the jurors' lack of education." 2 This criticism was not
justified from the purely theoretical standpoint. As Salvador Viada y Vil-
laseca pointed out, the jury represented the sovereign.1 3 If the rate of
convictions dropped, it demonstrated the will of the people. That result
was, by definition, the desired result and should have been respected de-
spite its failure to conform to the expectations of the fiscales.16
B. Empirical Evidence
Statistics paint a picture of the jury which contradicts the fiscales'
complaint. Admittedly, after 1888, the rate of not guilty verdicts in-
creased steadily. Of all jury trials conducted in 1888, 26 percent resulted
in acquittals. 6 " The level had reached 53 percent by 1922.166 The increase
was fairly steady as illustrated by graphing the percentage of not guilty
verdicts chronologically into a straight line regression formula.1 67 While
the individual provinces experienced more erratic increases, the national
(1900).
'5, INSTITUTO GEOGRAFICO Y ESTADiSTICO, 3 CENSO DE LA POBLACI6N ESPAPOLA 403
(1910).
159 INSTITUTO GEOGRAFICO Y EsTADISTIco 3 CENSO DE LA POBLACION ESPAIOLA 276-77
(1920).
160 FISCALfA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1921 MEMORIAS 41-42.
161 FISCALIA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMP, 1896 MEMORIAS 93.
161 FIsCALfA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1921 MEMORIAS 40.
,63 FISCALfA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1899 MEMORIAS 86.
" Felipe Sanchez Roman, the Solicitor General, talks of the jury functioning with reg-
ularity. He says the fiscales difficulties stemmed from having expected too much from the
jury system and having those expectations dashed. FisCALIA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPRzMO, 1898
MEMORIAs 76-77.
"I" See Appendix A, graph 1.
166 Id.




Interestingly, for the country as a whole, the increase in the acquittal
rate corresponds to the increase in the literacy rate. Approximately 29
percent of the population was literate in 1877,119 34 percent in 1900,170 38
percent in 1910,171 and 44 percent in 1920.172 Assuming that literates ap-
peared on juries in similarly increasing proportions, and accepting the
views of the fiscales, one would expect to find that the provinces with the
highest literacy rates would have had the lowest acquittal rates. This was
simply not the case.
The data indicates a positive correlation between increased literacy
and increased acquittal rates nationwide. There was a similar though less
striking correlation between increased acquittal rates and increased liter-
acy rates on the provincial level. Contrast Cadiz, with a 40 to 50 percent
literacy rate in 192073 and registering a decline in the percentage of ac-
quittals,' 7 ' with Cuenca, with the same literacy rate1 75 registering sharp
E ZXEy,
b=n
, x P~ = [--b-]-n 1
y = a+ b
LE~Y Ex?
and it was used in canned computer program developed by Hewlitt-Packard.
16 See generally, Appendix A. Of the 47 Peninsular provinces surveyed, only three,
Castellon, Zaragoza, and Huesca registered a decline in the percentage of acquittals between
1888 and 1923. See Appendix A, graphs 12, 21, & 48.
169 INSTITUTO GEOGRAFICO Y ESTAD!STICO, 1 Cz-,SO DE LA POBLAcI6N ESPAIROLA XXV
(1887).
170 INsTrrUTO GEOGRAPICO Y ESTADfSTICO, 2 CENSO DE LA POBLACI6N ESPAROLA 297
(1900).
: INSTrTUTO GEOGRAFICO Y~ ESTADfSTICO, 3 CENSO DE LA POBLACI6N ESPAR OLA 402
(1910).
17 s NSTITUO GEOGRAFICO Y ESTAnfSTICO, 3 CENSO DR LA POBLACI6N ESPAROLA LXII-
LXIII (1920).
175 Appendix B. Distribucion Geogr Lfica del Analfabetismo de Ia Poblaci6n de Mas de 5
Alias de Edad, INSTITUTO GEOGRAFICO Y ESTADfSTICO, 2 CENSO DE. LA POBLACI6N ESPAROLA
XXXVI (1920).
188 Appendix A, graph 11.
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increases in the number of acquittals176  between 1888 and 1920. Over the
same period Bilbao, with a literacy rate of over 70 percent,177 registered a
sharp increase in acquittals.178
The available data tend to disprove the theory that increased literacy
correlates to increased convictions. On the contrary, they tend to prove
just the opposite. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the data
do not take other factors which may affect a verdict into consideration.
The most important of these include: 1) the type of cases heard in each
province (crimes of property or violence);17 9 2) the experience of counsel;
and 3) the relationships between counsel, the parties, the judges, and the
jurors.
V. CONCLUSION
One conclusion which emerges from this examination is that apathy
and local patronage combined to create in the jury system what already
existed in the rest of the political and judicial structure. The same local
officials who controlled the political system also controlled the basic ma-
chinery for jury selection. Through their manipulation of the jury, local
officials were able to control the resilts of trials concerning political
crimes. While there was local manipulation of both the elections and the
jury, the central government only dictated the results of the former. Ap-
parently there was very little it could do to control trials. The govern-
ment did attempt to reform the jury selection process,8 0 but all for
nought. The Solicitors General expressed their frustration at not being
able to make the jury fit their images of how a jury system should
operate."'
Therefore, in Spain between 1888 and 1923, the people were the sov-
ereigns in theory only, the cacique and the encasillado exerting their in-
fluence to ensure that it stayed that way. Given the fact that Spain's rul-
ers considered only a maximum of 12 percent of the population eligible to
sit on juries, it is doubtful that the juries were ever intended to function
as an extension of the popular will in any but the most limited sense. The
resulting acquittal rates indicate that contrary to the Government's in-
tentions, the jury, outside of the area of political crimes, served as an
expression of popular notions of justice and sovereignty.
1I Appendix B.
170 Appendix A, graph 16.
1I Appendix B.
178 Appendix A graph 8.
179 See, e.g., FISCALIA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1896 MEMORIAS 102-10, and FISCALIA DEL
TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, 1899 MEMORmAS 82-83.
'80 161 Colecci6n Legislativa 369 (March 8, 1897).




All materials for this Appendix come from Fiscalid del Tribunal
Supremo, Memorias 1889-1923 and the Jefatura Superior de Estadistica,
1923-24 Anuario Estadistico 375 (1925). The author extends his gratitude
to Aifredo Bello and John Vogel whose assistance was instrumental in the
preparation and verification of the graphs.
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Appendix B
PERCENT OF POPULATION ILLITERATE IN 1920
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